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THE COMMITTEE OF CONSUMER 
SERVICES, 
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v. 
UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 20000893-SC 
PSC Docket No. 99-057-20 
Priority 14 
OPENING BRIEF 
OF THE COMMITTEE OF CONSUMER SERVICES 
Pursuant to Rules 24, 26, and 27 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
Petitioner Committee of Consumer Services ("Committee" or "CCS") submits its 
Opening Brief appealing a final Order of the Utah Public Service Commission 
(Xonrnission^or'TSC")1. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann.§ 78-2-2(3)(e)(i) (2001). 
lUtah Pub. Serv. Comm'n August 11, 2000 Report and Order. R99-057-20, 00704. 
This Order, together with its referenced attachments and the Dissent of Commission 
Chairman Mecham are attached under Addendum A. Note: citations to documents in the 
record will be in the form "R,a,b" where "R " will state which of the two docket 
proceedings is referenced, "a" is the Commission's Bates' stamp designation of the 
document number, and "b " is the internal page number of that document. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON REVIEW 
The Committee's appeal is based on the following legal issues: 
1. Whether the Commission can impose utility costs on ratepayers which it did 
not find were prudently incurred. This is an issue of law. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion and correction of error. Morton Int 7 v. 
Auditing Division, 814 P.2d 581, 583-587 (Utah 1991). 
2. Whether the Commission can impose utility costs on ratepayers based on 
reasoning that it need only decide a course of action produced a beneficial outcome 
without determining if other less costly or more efficacious options existed. This is an 
issue of law. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion and correction of error. Morton, 814 
P.2d at 583-587. 
3. Whether the Commission can allow utility costs into customer rates 
notwithstanding its explicit finding that it could not determine if other cost options were 
ruled in or out as a result of affiliate interests. This is an issue of law. 
Standard of Review: Abuse of discretion and correction of error. Morton, 814 
P.2d at 583-587. 
4. Whether a utility can prudently enter into a contract with its non-regulated 
affiliate company if the contract violates the Commission's requirements governing such 
transactions. This is an issue of law. 
2 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Morton, 814 P.2d at 583-587. 
5. Whether a contract can be an "arms-length transaction" if the person or 
persons acting as offeror and offeree and contractor and contractee for the contracting 
companies are the same. This is an issue of law. 
Standard of Review: Correction of error. Morton, 814 P.2d at 583-587. 
6. Whether the Commission can find utility costs to be fair and reasonable, 
and impose them on ratepayers, when the costs arise out of utility/affiliate company 
transactions that violate Commission standards and existing law regarding such 
transactions. This is an issue of law. 
Standard of review: Abuse of discretion and correction of error. Morton, 814 P.2d 
at 583-587. 
7. Whether the Commission erroneously interpreted and applied existing law 
regarding the burden of proof a utility must meet in rate proceedings. This is an issue of 
law. 
Standard of review: Correction of error. Morton, 814 P.2d at 583-587. 
8. Whether the Commission failed to establish just, reasonable and sufficient 
rates in these proceedings under Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-4(1). This is an issue of law. 
Standard of review: Abuse of discretion and correction of error. Morton, 814 P.2d 
at 583-587. 
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In compliance with Rule 24(a)(5)(A) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the 
Committee here notes that the foregoing issues were identified and raised, and therefore 
preserved on appeal, in the Committee's "Petition for Reconsideration" filed with the 
Commission on August 31, 2000, pursuant to Utah Code Ann.§ 54-7-15 (1987), Utah 
Code Ann.§ 63-46b-13 (2001), and Utah Admin. Code R746-100-1 IF (1999).2 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, REGULATIONS 
In addition to the statutory provisions cited above, the statutes that may be 
determinative of the issues raised in this appeal are:3 
Utah Code Ann.§ 54-3-1 (1977) Utah Code Ann.§ 54-4-4 (1975) 
Utah Code Ann.§ 54-4-1.5 (1983) Utah Code Ann.§ 63-46b-16(4) (1988) 
Utah Code Ann.§ 54-4-2 (1953) Utah Code Ann.§ 63-46b-17 (1987) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. This is a Petition to review a final Commission Order4 
which approved a settlement ("C02 Stipulation" or "Stipulation") between the Utah 
public utility, Questar Gas Company ("Questar Gas," "Company," "utility," or "QGC") 
and the Division of Public Utilities ("Division") and allowed the cost consequences of 
that settlement into customer rates despite conclusive evidence in the record that those 
2Petition of the Committee of Consumer Services for Reconsideration. R99-057-
20. 00737 (Aug. 31,2000). 
3The relevant statutory provisions are attached under Addendum C. 
4August 11, 2000 Final Report and Order. R99-057-20, 00704. [Addendum A]. 
4 
costs were imprudent, incurred to protect and advance affiliate interests, resulted from 
less than arms-length affiliate transactions, and were imposed upon the utility through 
affiliate control. 
2. Course of Proceedings. This case began with Questar Gas's November 25, 
1998, Application in PSC Docket No. 98-057-125 for approval of a non-arms-length 
contract between the utility and a subsidiary of its sister company, Questar Pipeline 
Company ("Questar Pipeline" or "QPC"), for the affiliate subsidiary to construct, own 
and operate, at ratepayer expense, a processing plant ("C02 Plant") to lower carbon 
dioxide ("C02ff) levels in coal-seam gas transported by Questar Pipeline and unwantedly 
appearing in Questar Gas's distribution system. The Committee and the Division 
opposed the Company's Application on the grounds the processing contract was an 
affiliate transaction not allowed recovery under Utah Code Ann.§ 54-7-12(5)(b)(i), and 
related provisions, which they believed governed the proceedings in question, and was 
further contrary to the Commission's 1984 Order approving Questar Corporation's 
("Questar") ownership of Questar Gas on the condition that an "arms-length" relationship 
5The Company's Application in Docket 98-057-12 is attached under Addendum G, 
along with its Application in these subsequent proceedings, Docket 99-057-20. 
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be maintained between the utility and its affiliate companies.6 On December 3, 1999, the 
Commission issued an order denying Questar Gas's application, finding the gas cost pass-
through proceeding an improper proceeding in which to seek approval of the contract and 
its costs.7 Questar Gas appealed the Commission's decision to this Court, which, in an 
October 23, 2001, decision, set aside the Commission's finding that the gas cost pass-
through proceeding was an improper forum for recovery and remanded the case for 
further Commission action in accordance with the Court's ruling.8 
Concurrent with its appeal of Docket 98-057-12, the Company initiated these 
general rate case proceedings on December 16, 2000, to increase distribution non-gas 
revenues by $22,227,000, or 11.4 percent. A substantial part of the requested rate 
increase (just over $7 million) was to cover C02 Plant costs for which the Company was 
denied rate recovery in the previous proceedings. On May 4, 2000, the Commission 
granted the Company's unopposed motion to take official notice of the Docket 98-057-12 
6Direct Test, of Division witness Darrell S. Hanson, R98-057-12, 00180, 3-4 (Apr. 
1, 1999); Post Hearing Brief of the Division of Public Utilities, R98-057-12, 00071, 2-5 
(Sep. 9, 1999); Post Hearing Brief of the Committee of Consumer Services, R98-057-12, 
00072, 3-4. The Commission's October 1, 1984 Order in Mountain Fuel, Docket 84-057-
10 is attached under Addendum E. Mr. Hanson's prepared testimony in Docket 98-057-
12 and in these proceedings, Docket 99-057-20, is attached under Addendum H. 
7Questar Gas, R98-057-12, 00007, 7, (December 3, 1999) (Report and Order). This 
order is attached under Addendum D. 
^Questar Gas v. Utah Public Service Comm 'n, 34 P.3d 218 (Utah 2001). 
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record in these proceedings.9 On June 2, 2000, a "C02 Stipulation"10 between the 
Division and Questar Gas, which allowed up to $5 million annually in rates for C02 Plant 
processing costs (approximately sixty-eight percent of the Plant's first year's actual 
costs), and which the Committee opposed, was submitted to the Commission. Hearings 
in the general rate case were held June 5-8, 2000, and June 23,2000. 
3. Disposition Below. The Commission's August 11,2000 Report and Order 
approved the C02 Stipulation and allowed C02 Plant costs into customer rates. 
Commission Chairman, Stephen F. Mecham, dissented, faulting Questar Gas and its 
affiliate sister company, Questar Pipeline, for not seeking earlier Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission ("FERC") modification of Questar Pipeline's tariff specification 
on gas quality, which he stated could have prevented the dispute before the Commission 
over the C02 Plant and its costs.11 
9There was some confusion in the record as to when the Commission officially 
responded to this motion. At the beginning of the hearing to consider the C02 
Stipulation, the Commission reaffirmed its decision to take official notice of the record of 
its Docket 98-057-12 proceedings. See Rep. Tr. of Proceedings, R99-O57-20, 00755, 11-
13 (June 5, 2000). Those incorporated proceedings will hereafter be referred to as the 
earlier or prior proceedings. 
l0The C02 Stipulation is included in Appendix 3 to the Commission's August 11, 
2000 Report and Order in Docket No. 99-057-20. [Addendum A]. 
"Dissent and Comment of Chairman Stephen F. Mecham, R99-057-20, 00704, 60. 
Chairman Mecham's Dissent and Comment is attached to the Commission's August 11, 
2000 Report and Order. [Addendum A]. Questar Pipeline's interstate pipeline business is 
subject to federal government regulation by the FERC. 
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The Committee's August 31, 2000 petition to the Commission to reconsider its 
order on the grounds that it did not address the prudence of the Company's actions or the 
critical related affiliate interest issues evidenced in the record, or hold the Company to its 
burden of proof regarding those issues, expired without Commission response. 
4. Statement of Facts. In April 1998 Questar Gas entered into a non-arms-
length contract12 with a newly-created, non-regulated, subsidiary of its sister company, 
Questar Pipeline, for the QPC subsidiary to construct, own, and operate, at utility 
expense,13 an $18 million C02 Plant14 to reduce carbon dioxide levels in coal-seam gas 
produced in growing quantities near Price, Utah, and appearing in increasing quantities in 
the utility's distribution system.15 The low-BTU coal-seam gas, unwanted by Questar 
12The contract was not competitively bid and no arms-length bargaining or 
negotiations occurred between the parties to the contract. Direct Test, of Division witness 
Lowell E. Alt, Jr., R99-057-20, 000865, 3 (April 19, 2000). 
13Under Article II of the November 25, 1998, "Carbon Dioxide Extraction 
Agreement,"Questar Transportation Services is to be paid all "(b) Just and reasonable 
expenses and a (c) return on plant investment " R98-057-12, 00007, 3. A copy of this 
agreement is attached to the Company's Application as Exhibit 5. [Addendum G]. 
14Prepared Test. Of Company witness John P. Snider, R98-057-12, 00133, 9; and 
attached Exhibit 4.3 (February 1, 1999). 
15Paragraph 9 of the Company's Application in the prior proceedings states: 
Increased production of coal seam gas on QPC's southern system is 
making it impossible to maintain the BTU content of the gas delivered 
through the southern system to QGC's customers within the 1020 to 
1080 range. R98-07-12, 00001, 4. [Addendum G]. 
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Gas, and incompatible with the long-established BTU requirements of its customers, 
nevertheless entered its distribution system because of specific Questar Pipeline business 
decisions earlier in the decade to transport that gas, and to do so by displacement, in the 
same pipeline system that was historically constructed to transport the utility-selected gas 
which met its long-established BTU heat content requirements.17 Questar Gas is Questar 
Pipeline's captive, and most important, customer, controlling well over half of QPC's 
total reserved pipeline capacity. 
The decisions that Questar Gas and its ratepayers would pay for the construction 
and operation of the C02 Plant, and the utility would contract with a non-regulated 
Questar Pipeline subsidiary that would own and operate it, were made by Mr. D.N. Rose, 
president and CEO of Questar Regulated Services Company18 ("Questar Regulated 
Services" or "QRS"), the holding company parent of Questar Gas and Questar Pipeline. 
Because Questar Regulated Services holding company officers and managers also 
manage QRS's operating subsidiaries, Mr. Rose also made those decisions in his 
Paragraph 2 of Company's Application in the prior proceedings. R98-057-12, 
00001, 1. [Addendum G]. Company witness Alan K. Allred testified that the utility's gas 
BTU content requirements had been established: "[f]or as far back as anybody working 
in the company can remember, or as far back as any records we could find." Rep. Tr. of 
Proceedings. R98-057-12, 00086, 75 (June 7, 1999). 
17Direct Test, of Committee witness Michael J. McFadden. R98-057-12, 00192, 
18-19 (April 1, 1999). [Addendum J]. Originally, Questar Pipeline's pipeline system was 
designed and constructed as an extension of Questar Gas's distribution operations. 
I8Statement by Company witness Alan K. Allred. Rep. Tr. of Proceedings, R98-
057-12, 00087, 17-18 (June 22, 1999). 
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simultaneous capacities of president and CEO of Questar Gas and president and CEO of 
Questar Pipeline.19 
In the early 1990s Questar Corporation decided to purposefully pursue the new 
business opportunity of transporting Price area coal-seam gas, and secured that 
opportunity by means of "future capacity" contracts negotiated between Questar Pipeline 
and the coal-seam gas producers. Under the terms of those contracts, QPC agreed to 
expand its pipeline system to accommodate the producers' growing transport 
l9A chart of the organizational structure of Questar Corporation and its subsidiaries 
at the time was filed as an exhibit to testimony supporting the Company's Application in 
Docket 99-057-20, and is included, as the final page, with the Company's Docket 99-057-
20 Application in Addendum G. Questar Regulated Services was formed in 1995 as a 
division of Questar Corporation to manage the vertically integrated natural resource 
company's regulated business operations. It became a second-tier holding company 
parent of Questar Gas and Questar Pipeline in 1996 (Questar 1996 Annual Report, p. 16). 
Questar's December 31, 1998, Form 10-K filing with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission describes, on page 7, the common integrated management of Questar Gas, 
Questar Pipeline, and Questar Regulated Services as follows: 
All members of the Regulated Services group have common officers and share 
service functions, e.g., marketing, planning, business development, 
engineering, compensation, legal, regulatory affairs, accounting, and 
budgeting. All Regulated Services employees share base and incentive 
compensation programs and are expected to work together to improve 
customer service and operating efficiency. The integration of the entities has 
resulted in lower operating and maintenance costs and better coordination of 
activities and projects. 
10 
requirements,20 and that expansion was accomplished in subsequent years through 
substantial additional investment by Questar Corporation.21 
Although most Price-area coal-seam gas production is sold to out-of-state markets, 
QPC decided to transport it in the same pipeline system that transports the utility-selected 
gas, thus allowing it to mix with that higher BTU utility gas. Moreover, QPC decided to 
transport the coal-seam gas by displacement in its southern pipeline system, which 
decision necessarily led to coal-seam gas actually displacing the utility-ordered gas in the 
pipeline system which was designed and constructed to serve Questar Gas's distribution 
needs. The result was the delivery of unwanted and incompatible coal-seam gas to the 
20The confidential transport contracts which Questar Pipeline executed with the 
coal seam gas producers, beginning as early as 1991, were provided by the Company in 
response to Division and Committee discovery requests. They were "Future Capacity" 
agreements, for capacity not currently available on Questar Pipeline's system, and 
obligated QPC to install the additional capacity by a future date certain or the coal seam 
gas producer could terminate the agreement. Direct Test, of Division witness Darrell S. 
Hanson, R99-057-20, 00380, 4 (April 1, 1999). [Addendum H]. Rebuttal Test, of Darrell 
S. Hanson, R98-057-12, 00182, 8-9 (June 23, 1999). [Addendum H]. 
21
 Questar publicly reported throughout this period on the further expansion and 
upgrades being made to Questar Pipeline's system to accommodate the coal seam gas 
producers' growing transport requirements, and the investment cost of those projects. 
1993 Annual Report, p. 19; 1994 Annual Report, p. 20; 1996 Annual Report, p. 23; 1997 
Questar Annual Report, p. 26; 1998 Annual Report, p. 25; 1999 Annual Report, pp. 28-
29. 
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utility's customers while the utility's higher BTU gas was pushed eastward to the benefit 
of other users.22 
Questar knew at the time it captured the business of transporting the Price area 
coal-seam gas that the gas was incompatible with Questar Gas's long-established gas heat 
content requirements, and for several years thereafter Questar Pipeline successfully 
ameliorated the gas's negative effect by blending it with higher BTU gas sources, and by 
other means.23 However, sometime prior to 1998 it became evident to Questar that the 
growing quantities of coal-seam gas would soon exceed such palliative Questar Pipeline 
measures, and a more comprehensive and permanent solution was necessary.24 In early 
1997 Questar Regulated Services formed a Gas Quality Team to "suggest possible 
modifications to [Questar Pipeline's gas quality] specifications and other potential 
methods to deal with gas quality issues."25 The Team met periodically from May 1997 
22Direct Test, of Committee Witness Michael J. McFadden, R99-057-20, 00928, 3-
4 (April 19, 2000). [Addendum J]. Under [Addendum B] is a copy of a map from 
Questar Corporation's 1998 Annual Report, which locates Questar Gas's distribution 
system and Questar Pipeline's transmission system. The Price-area coal seam gas 
production fields and the C02 Plant are not shown on the map, but are located near Price, 
Utah near the lower, purple-colored, east-west QPC transmission pipeline. 
23Paragraph 9 of the Company's Application in the prior proceedings. R98-057-
12,00001,4. 
24Id 
25Gas Quality Team, April 25, 1997, Agenda. R98-057-12, 00155. [Addendum F]. 
Company witness Gary D. DeBernardi, a vice president of Questar Regulated Services, 
stated the decisions to form the Team and set its agenda were made by "the Management 
Committee of Questar Regulated Services." Rep. Tr. of Proceedings. R98-057-12, 
00087, 190. (June 22, 1999). 
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through April 1998, during which time it evidently decided that Questar Pipeline would 
not seek to modify its existing gas quality specifications to reduce the allowable content 
of C02 in gas transported in its pipeline system. Such a modification would have had the 
likely effect of requiring the coal-seam gas producers to incur the added cost of facilities 
to further treat their gas, shut in production, or encourage the development of other 
pipeline transmission company sources that would not impose that requirement.26 
Instead, Questar Regulated Services solved the problem at no further cost or business risk 
to Questar Pipeline or the coal-seam gas producers by having the utility bear the cost for a 
Questar Pipeline subsidiary to build, own, and operate the $18 million C02 Plant to lower 
C02 content in the Price-area coal-seam gas entering Questar Pipeline's transport system 
- whether the gas ended up in the utility's distribution system or not.27 The newly-
constructed Plant began operations in June 1999.28 
Questar Gas filed an Application on November 25, 1998 in Docket 98-057-12 
requesting Commission approval of its coal seam gas processing contract with Questar 
Pipeline's subsidiary and the inclusion of the C02 Plant costs in customer rates. 
26Direct Test, of Division Witness Darrell S. Hanson, R98-057-12, 00180, 12-13, 
(April 1, 1999). [Addendum H]. Direct Test, of Division Witness Lowell E. Alt, Jr., R99-
057-20, 000865, 3, lines 14-17, (April 19, 2000). 
^Representations 1 and 2 of the Parties on page 1 of the November 25, 1998 
"Carbon Dioxide Extraction Agreement". This C02 Plant agreement is Exhibit 5 to the 
Company's Application in the prior proceedings. R98-057-12, 00001. [Addendum G]. 
28C02 Stipulation. R99-057-20, 00915, Para 9. [Addendum A]. 
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Subsequent events relating to the earlier Docket 98-057-12 proceedings and these 
subsequent Docket 99-057-20 proceedings are described in Subsections 2 and 3 above. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Commission never determined in these proceedings whether the C02 Plant 
costs were prudent. It never determined whether they were reasonably incurred or 
whether the Plant remedy was less expensive or more efficacious than other alternatives 
available to the Company. It never even determined that it was the utility's responsibility 
to correct Questar's coal seam gas problem. The Commission's awkward avoidance of 
those critical prudence determinations in approving the C02 Settlement between the 
Company and the Division was a transparent attempt to skirt the weighty affiliate control 
and conflict of interest issues that are inextricably entwined with the question of prudence 
in these proceedings. 
Affiliate control and conflict of interest were stubborn, persuasive, and in many 
instances, conclusively demonstrated factual elements of these proceedings. Questar 
Regulated Services' complete day-to-day management control of Questar Gas was 
conclusively shown - even confirmed by the forthright admission of the utility's principal 
Questar Regulated Services' witness. That linchpin fact should have been the point of 
departure in the Commission's reasoning and findings, yet the Order never mentions it. 
The obvious conflicting interests between Questar Gas and its parent and sister affiliates 
over Questar Pipeline's profitable transport of the Price-area coal-seam gas was also 
established in the record yet never meaningfully addressed in the Commission's Order. 
14 
The obvious and troubling non-arms-length nature of the C02 Plant contract between the 
utility and its sister company's unregulated subsidiary was commented on by the 
Commission during hearings and was specifically noted, in passing, in the Commission's 
Order as "the most troubling question,"29 but even that acknowledgment failed to give rise 
to any consequent Commission discussion or findings despite the fact that the contract 
obviously contravenes Commission policy - and this Court's interpretation of that policy 
- regarding affiliate transactions. 
These proceedings aren't about Questar Corporation's right to profitably pursue 
the business of gathering, storing, and transporting Price-area coal-seam gas. They are 
rather about its attempt to do so with the added competitive, but legally improper, 
advantage of a ratepayer subsidy and the Commission's failure to address that reality - a 
reality whose easily discernible outer edges patently violate the Commission's own policy 
regarding affiliate transactions. The facts and issues addressed in this Petition will 
disclose the Commission's legal errors and abuse of discretion in attempting to ignore 
those central issues in these proceedings. Further, this Petition will show that even if the 
Commission's erroneous findings were correct, it still erred in allowing C02 Plant costs 
into customer rates because it very clearly determined that the Company failed to sustain 
its burden of proof to show that the C02 Plant costs were fair and reasonable. The relief 
the Committee seeks from this Court is a reversal of the Commission's decision which 
approved the C02 Stipulation and allowed C02 Plant costs into the Company's rates. 
29Questar Gas, R99-057-20, 00704, 35 (August 11, 2000 Report and Order). 
[Addendum A]. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE COMMISSION AVOIDED ITS DUTY AND ABUSED ITS 
DISCRETION BY NOT ADDRESSING THE PRUDENCE OF 
THE COMPANY'S DECISIONS AND ACTIONS IN 
RESOLVING QUESTAR'S GAS QUALITY PROBLEM. 
There are three critical points of departure in the reasoning in the Commission's 
August 11, 2000 Order that illuminate and trace its avoidance of the central question in 
these general rate proceedings: whether the decisions and actions of the Company which 
led to the costs it seeks to recover from ratepayers were prudent. Those points of 
departure are, in the Commission's own words: 
"[W]hether the contested C02 Stipulation resolves [this dispute]... in 
a way that is reasonable and in the public interest... turns first on the 
problem that lies at the heart of the issue. QGC asserts the problem is 
customer safety; CCS, production and transportation of coal seam gas. 
It turns second on whether we must rule on the decision to enter the 
contract (whether prudent) or instead can examine the outcome of that 
decision (whether reasonable)."30 
• "The record is insufficient to permit us to determine whether the 
Company's analysis of options prior to early 1998 was sufficiently 
objective and thorough, that is, to reach a conclusion whether options 
were ruled in or out as a result of the influence of affiliate interests."31 
and 
• "Clearly, QGC has the burden to demonstrate the decision to enter the 
contract is a prudent one. Parties differ as to whether it did so 
successfully. But whether or not QGC met this burden, we can and do 
conclude that its decision to procure gas processing has yielded the 
required result, that is, it has effectively protected the safety of its 
30M at 33-34. 
3lId at 34. 
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customers. This means the costs of gas processing can be legitimately 
recovered in rates."32 
To facilitate this Court's further understanding of the illogic of the Commission's 
Order disclosed, in part, in the above three pivotal statements, this Argument will turn 
first to the purported insufficiency of the record regarding affiliate control and conflict of 
interest. With the persuasive, indeed in many instances conclusive, record of affiliate 
control and conflict of interest before the Court, the Commission's abuse of discretion 
and error in ignoring it will be evident. 
A. Affiliate Control of Ouestar Gas 
1. Affiliate Officer and Management Control Structure 
The management and control changes Questar Corporation made to Questar Gas in 
the mid-1990fs decapitated the utility by removing its separate decision-making and 
operating capability and integrating its officer and management positions with those of its 
non-state-regulated parent and sister companies under the overall executive direction of 
the president and CEO of the parent company. Those management and control changes 
have been regularly noted and described since their implementation in Questar 
Corporation's annual reports to shareholders and Security and Exchange Commission 
filings, and were common knowledge in these proceedings. Their existence and operative 
effect on Questar Gas were further explicitly acknowledged in testimony by the 
Company's principal witness, Alan K. Allred, in these proceedings: 
lId at 35. 
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Q In terms of drawing your conclusion about the prudence of the C02 
processing plant that is at issue in this case, from which of the Questar 
Company's (sic) standpoint are you defining prudence? 
A I'm defining it from the standpoint of Questar Gas. . . 
Q So in other words, the hat you're wearing today is that of Questar 
Gas? 
A Yes, I'm appearing on behalf of Questar Gas. 
Q But you stated on the stand that you represent Questar Regulated 
Services. And how does that fit into the overall corporate structure? 
A Questar Regulated Services provided certain services to both Questar 
Gas and Questar Pipeline. In my particular area, I am in charge of the 
regulatory activities for both Questar Gas and Questar Pipeline, as 
well as the gas supply activities of Questar Gas. 
Q So in some sense, you wear two hats on occasion? 
A I have job responsibilities that deal with both Questar Gas and 
Questar Pipeline, so in common parlance, I guess that could be 
sporting two hats 
Q And who do you report to at Questar Regulated Services? 
A I report to Mr. D.N. Rose, the president and CEO. 
Q And he's the top official at QRS, Questar Regulated? 
A He is. 
Q And who's the top official at Questar Gas? 
A Mr. Rose is also the President and CEO of Questar Gas. 
Q In this case, who was the, quote/unquote, prudent manager who was 
responsible for making the decision to go with the C0 2 processing 
plant as a means of solving the problem with the coal seam gas? 
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A As I recall, that decision was arrived at by Mr. Rose and his staff, 
of which I'm a member . . . 
Q Did anybody, if there is such a person that could act just on behalf of just 
Questar Gas, make any effort to get Questar Pipeline to take steps to solve 
this problem? 
A We certainly looked at and said what could Questar Pipeline do to 
solve this problem. We did not see a way to do that at any lower cost 
or any better solution than the one we chose. If we had, we would have 
pursued it.33 [Emphasis added, ed.]. 
This Company admission confirms several essential points regarding affiliate 
control that were never further challenged, qualified, or refuted by the parent company 
representatives of Questar Gas in these proceedings. First the president and CEO of the 
non-regulated parent company is the president and CEO of the utility and its sister 
company, Questar Pipeline, as well. Second, Mr. Allred occupies important management 
positions for both Questar Gas and Questar Pipeline, and is also a member of the "staff5 of 
the President of Questar Regulated Services.34 Third, the utility's management authority 
and Questar Pipeline's management authority embodied in the word "we" is very clearly a 
parent company authority binding on both Questar Gas and Questar Pipeline. And, fourth, 
no officer or management person exists within Questar Gas who can reasonably and 
33Rep. Tr. of Proceedings, R98-057-12, 00087, 16-17, and 116 (June 22, 1999). 
340ther representatives of the Company in these and the prior proceedings have 
also indicated they hold important parent company positions that manage the affairs of 
Questar Gas as well. Barrie L. McKay identified himself in his prepared testimony as 
"Director of Regulatory Affairs" for Questar Regulated Services (R99-057-20, 00063, 1)8 
Gary Bernardi identified himself as "Vice President, Technical Services" for Questar 
Regulated Services (R98-057-12, 00126, 1). 
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independently represent and defend the utility's interests; not only before the Commission 
and the outside world, but against opposing affiliate interests within Questar Corporation 
itself. Questar Corporation's parent company control - overt, complete, and formal 
management control - of the utility and its sister company, Questar Pipeline, is a linchpin 
fact which should have dictated the structure and findings of the Commission's Order in 
these proceedings. The Commission's avoidance of that linchpin fact was obviously 
contrived in order to avoid the prudence issues and findings that should have determined 
the outcome of these proceedings. 
2. The Gas Quality Team was a Manifestation of Affiliate Control 
The agendas, minutes, and notes of the Gas Quality Team, which are part of the 
record of these proceedings, provide important insight into how the affairs of the utility 
were managed and controlled by its affiliate Questar companies during this period. 
Questar Gas was asked in repeated Committee and Division discovery requests for copies 
of "all" documentation addressing any utility analysis of the coal-seam gas problem, 
including any alternative solutions the utility considered.35 The documentation provided 
by the Company included "Attachment 4 — Gas Quality Team Minutes and Notes."36 That 
documentation, rather than showing some prudent utility analysis, only further underscores 
35Rebuttal Test, of Division witness Darrell S. Hanson, R98-057-12, 00182, 3 
(June 23, 1999). [Addendum H]. 
36Gas Quality Team Minutes and Notes, R98-057-12, 00154 (Attachment 4). 
[Addendum F]. 
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the control Questar Regulated Services exercised over the utility's affairs with regard to 
Questar's gas quality problem. 
The disclosed Gas Quality Team agendas, minutes, and notes show the team was 
created by, and reported to, Questar Regulated Services. It was never guided or controlled 
by Questar Gas.37 The documentation further shows the function and focus of this 
supposed Questar Gas effort to be heavily influenced by the conflicting interests of 
Questar Pipeline. The first recorded minutes of the Team, a document dated April 25, 
1997, states its essential Questar Pipeline focus: 
Determine the operating and economic impact of the existing QPC gas quality 
specifications with respect to interconnecting pipelines and the MFS and QPC 
systems and suggest possible modifications to the specifications and other 
potential methods to deal with gas quality issues (Consider enforcement 
37In his April 26, 1999, Rebuttal Testimony, Company witness Gary W. 
DeBernardi, a Vice President of Questar Regulated Services, attempts to minimize the 
meaning and effect of the non-Questar Gas focus and control of the Gas Quality Team: 
Q Mr. Hanson implies that the make-up of the team affected the selection 
of the C02 team plant option. Is this accurate? 
A Yes, but not in the manner alleged by Mr. Hanson. The fact that both 
operating companies (QPC and QGC) and QRS were represented did 
influence the recommendations and decisions made concerning gas 
quality issues. That was the intent when the team was formed. 
Questar's management recognized that gas quality issues (not just 
C02), effecting QPC would also affect QGC as QPC's largest 
customer. By bringing together representatives from these companies, 
all aspects of the issues were discussed and evaluated (R98-057-12, 
00130,2). 
This response of Mr. DeBernardi only further confirms the non-utility focus of the team's 
effort. Note the words "Questar's management recognized." 
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mitigation issues).38 ["MFS" refers to Mountain Fuel Supply, the former name 
of Questar Gas, ed.] 
The Questar Pipeline focus of the team is even more apparent in the list of issues 
accompanying that April 25, 1997 document; the fifth of which pointedly raises the 
conflict of interest between Questar Pipeline and Questar Gas regarding the coal-seam gas: 
What are the operational and economic impacts of changing our specs on QPC 
and MFS systems?39 
The subsequent minutes and notes of the Gas Quality Team further illustrate the direct 
control Questar Regulated Services exercised over the utility's affairs during this period, 
and how that control was exercised in addressing and resolving the problem which Questar 
Pipeline's transport of Price-area coal-seam gas created. 
3. Questar Regulated Services' Presence in these Proceedings was 
a Further Manifestation of its Complete Control of Questar Gas 
One claimed benefit of the reorganization of Mountain Fuel Supply Company into 
Questar Corporation, which the Commission addressed in its 1984 Order,40 was it would 
create a "clear line of demarcation between state-regulated utility activities and those 
38This entry, as well as those cited just below, can be further read in its context in 
the Gas Quality Team Notes and Minutes. [Addendum F]. 
39See the April 25, 1997 Issue List in the Gas Quality Team Notes and Minutes. 
[Addendum F]. 
40Mountain Fuel, 84-057-10 (October 1, 1984) (Final Order), pp. 4-5. [Addendum 
E]. 
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Questar activities not under state utility regulation."41 Whatever "arms-length 
relationship"42 the 1984 reorganization may have thus established was fatally 
compromised in the subsequent Questar changes that did away with any separate 
officer/management structure for Questar Gas and placed its decision-making capabilities 
under the direct and complete control of its non-regulated Questar parent. So decapitating 
Questar Gas not only destroyed the utility's ability to govern itself; it also seriously 
handicaped the regulator's ability "to regulate the distribution utility as the public interest 
demands,"43 since it destroys the essential ability of the utility to perceive and exercise its 
utility interests, and those of ratepayers, separate from the interests of its non-state-
regulated affiliate companies. 
This was borne out in a practical and critically important way in the presentation of 
Questar Gas's case in these proceedings. Questar Gas's principal witness was Questar 
Regulated Services' Manager of Regulatory and Gas Supply Services, and virtually all 
other Company in-house witnesses were Questar Regulated Services personnel. That 
fundamental non-arms-length reality affected all Company testimony in these proceedings 
- its testimony on the nature and source of the coal-seam gas problem, on the viability and 
4 l Mat4 . 
42This is a phrase used by this Court to describe the kind of separation between 
Questar affiliates and the utility which the Commission's 1984 Order required. See the 
discussion on pages 38-39, following. 
43Mountain Fuel, 84-057-10, 2 (October 1, 1984) (Final Order). [Addendum E]. 
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cost calculation of possible remedies, and on the alleged prudence of Questar Gas's 
decisions. Questar Regulated Services not only controlled if, when, and how Questar Gas 
responded to the coal-seam gas problem Questar created; it also controlled how the 
utility^ application for rate recovery was presented before the Commission. That plain 
fact was daily before the Commission throughout the hearings and in prepared testimony 
in these and the prior proceedings. 
B. Affiliate Conflict of Interest 
There were obvious serious conflicting business interests between Questar Gas and 
its affiliates regarding Questar Pipeline's transport of the Price-area coal-seam gas. The 
serious nature of that conflict is captured in the testimony of a Large Industrial Group 
witness: 
In its role as pipeline owner and local distribution company owner, the Questar 
Corporation faced a conflict of interest. From the point of view of the 
pipeline, transportation of enormous quantities of coal-seam gas represented 
significant potential revenues. On the other hand, Questar Corporation has 
obligations to the customers in the [utility's] territory to ensure a safe gas 
supply. It was in the pipeline company's interest to court the coal-seam 
producers to acquire their business. . . [Procuring a subsidy from captive 
customers for C02 removal costs would enhance the corporation's business 
development prospects, whereas ensuring a safe gas supply by having the 
producers of the coal-seam gas pay for C02 removal ran counter to Questar's 
corporate interest. In weighing the alternatives, it appears that Questar 
Corporation made a business decision that included a calculated risk that it 
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could convince the Utah Commission to force the captive customers of QGC 
[the utility] to pay for the costs of C02 removal.44[Emphasis added, ed.]. 
1. Source of the Conflict of Interest was Questar Pipeline's 
Transport of Central Utah Coal Seam Gas 
The obvious fact that Questar Pipeline's transport of the Price-area coal-seam gas 
engendered a serious conflict of interest between Questar Corporation's pipeline 
subsidiary and its Utah public utility is further emphasized here only because of the 
apparently successful attempt by parent company representatives to minimize or obfuscate 
it during these proceedings. 
Questar Gas's application for rate recovery identifies the source of Questar 
Corporation's gas quality problem as "increased production of coal seam gas on QPC's 
southern system,"45 but volunteers nothing about Questar Pipeline's role as prime mover 
and its conflicting profitable interest in transporting that gas. That conflict, however, 
shines brightly in unfiltered and frank observations by members of the Gas Quality Team 
Prefiled Direct Test, of Large Industrial Group witness Kevin C. Higgins, R99-
057-20, 01216, 9 (April 19, 2000). Mr. Higgins also explained how Questar 
Corporation's remedy to make utility customers pay the cost to solve the coal seam gas 
quality problem runs counter to "[o]ne of the fundamental principals in ratemaking:" 
• . .that costs should be assigned to those parties who cause the costs to be 
incurred . . . It would be most economically efficient for the costs of C02 
removal to be treated as a cost of production that is paid by the producers. 
That way, market forces will govern the rational development of the resource. 
In contrast, QGC's approach is likely to create subsidies, which will blur the 
lines of rational decision making, leaving it unclear whether development of 
the coal seam resource is economically efficient in the first instance. (Pages 9-
11). 
45Questar Gas, R98-057-12, 00001, \ 9 (November 25, 1998) (Initial Application) 
[Addendum G]. 
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in the Team's minutes and notes and was highlighted in Committee and Division witness 
testimony. Division Energy Manager, Lowell E. Alt, as well as Division witness Darrell 
S. Hanson, cited some of those observations by Gas Quality Team members and the 
conflict of interest they substantiate. Witness Hanson stated: 
Some reasons can be found in the following comments of members on the Gas 
Quality Team: 
If QPC raises its BTU requirement we will not be able to ship gas 
for anyone but MFS. We would ultimately be a 'gathering system5 for 
MFS. (12/31/97 Minutes) 
Under the discussion of'Southern System Options - Shut in River Gas' 
one bullet reads4Largest Development on QPC System/ (Presentation 
made to Nick Rose, President of QGC and QPC latter part of November 
1997) 
When we talk about shutting in coal seam gas it is always brought up 
that if we don't transport the gas someone else will my question is if 
someone else can build a pipeline to transport the gas and it is 
economically feasible why can't we? (12/3/97 Minutes) 
This illustrates that the Questar companies had a concern that if they solved the 
low BTU problem by changing the gas quality specifications in the QPC tariff 
it would upset the other QPC transportation customers to the extent that they 
might look for another pipeline to build facilities into the area and transport 
their gas. This presents a conflict of interest between QPC and QGC. QGC 
was not, and is not, independent in searching for the cheapest way to solve the 
low BTU problem.46 [Emphasis added, ed.]. 
Mr. Alt's testimony, which oddly enough was given to support the Division's 
decision to enter into the C02 Stipulation with the Company, is, in part, as follows: 
46Direct Test, of Division witness Darrell S. Hanson, R98-057-12, 00180, 12-13 
(April 1, 1999). [Addendum H]. 
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In sum, after extensive review of information in this case and No. 98-057-12, 
the Division believes that the actions of QGC were not entirely prudent 
QGC's actions, or in-actions, appear to be influenced by affiliate relations 
more than the financial interests of its customers.47 
We believe, based on the information available to us, that QGC did not 
adequately explore the alternative of trying to get a change in QPC gas quality 
specifications that could have reduced the need for, or amount of, C02 
processing required. It appears that affiliate interests influenced this 
outcome. Also, QGC chose not to bid the whole C0 2 processing project, 
but instead contracted with an unregulated affiliate.48 [Emphasis added, 
ed.]. 
In response to the question: "Can you provide an example of the affiliate interests 
concern?," Mr. Alt stated: 
Some of the best examples are found in Questar's Gas Quality Team meeting 
minutes...: 
September 9, 1997 -'If QPC raises its BTU requirement, we would not be able 
to ship gas for anyone but MFS. We would ultimately be a gathering system for 
MFS.' 
December 3, 1997 - 'When we talk about shutting in the coal seam gas it is 
always brought up that if we don't transport the gas someone else will. My 
question is if someone else can build a pipeline to transport the gas and it is 
economically feasible why can't we.' 
Further discussion of this concern is contained in Mr. Hanson's testimony.49 
Opposing witnesses throughout these and the earlier proceedings continued to emphasize 
the conflict of interest between Questar Gas and its Questar affiliates, and why it was not 
47Direct Test of Division witness Lowell E. Alt, Jr., R99-057-20, 000865, 3, 14-17 
(April 19,2000). 
48/d. at 3, lines 19-21; 4, lines 1-2. 
49Id at 4, lines 16-21; 5, lines 1-6. 
27 
in Questar affiliates5 interest to pursue a remedy that would make Questar Pipeline or the 
coal-seam gas producers responsible for the costs to make their gas compatible for utility 
customers: 
One incentive would be to keep producers happy as transportation customers. 
Questar did not want to lose this potential market. It didn't want to risk another 
pipeline being built into the area that would take away this additional 
transportation business. 
A more subtle reason is that it could increase profits that Questar companies 
could get from providing some of the services in the chain from the wellhead 
to the point where price is determined by market conditions. Examples of these 
services are gathering, transportation, storage, and marketing.50 
Utilizing data supplied by the Company, Division witness Hanson calculated the 
substantial profits flowing to Questar affiliate companies from Questar Pipeline's transport 
of the Price-area coal-seam gas. He calculated annual revenues in 1999 at $6,332,817 and 
net revenues at $3,408,000, and projected those numbers could increase substantially as 
production from the coal-seam gas beds increased.51 The Company never challenged 
those profit projections. 
Committee expert witness, Michael J. McFadden, testified regarding a solution to 
Questar's gas quality problem which Questar affiliates never seriously considered at the 
time; namely, for the utility to acquire, or threaten to acquire, all or a substantial part of its 
gas supply from a non-Questar Pipeline source. He concluded conflicting affiliate 
50Direct Test, of Division witness Darrell S. Hanson, R99-057-20, 00380, 5 (April 
19,2000). [Addendum H]. 
51Id at 8-11. See also Rep. Tr. of Proceedings, R99-057-20, 00755, 204-208 (June 
5, 2000). 
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interests prevented any fruitful exploration of that alternative even though it appeared to 
be less expensive than the C02 Plant remedy Questar Gas ratepayers were being asked to 
pay for.52 Large Customer Group witness Kevin C. Higgins testified: 
Placing the C02 removal costs into rates would inappropriately reward Questar 
Corporation for choosing to sacrifice the interests of the captive customers of 
QGC in a situation in which the corporation had a clear conflict of interest 
between its obligations to those customers in the QGC territory on the one hand 
and the corporation's financial interest in providing transportation and other 
services through non-QGC affiliates on the other hand.53 [Emphasis added, ed.]. 
The evidence in the record on the serious conflict of interest between Questar Gas 
and its other Questar affiliates is thus very clear - even documented in the minutes and 
notes of Questar Regulated Services' Gas Quality Team.54 The Company attempted to 
counter or neutralize this evidence with the assertion that Questar Pipeline had to accept 
and transport the coal-seam gas under FERC regulations. The deficiency of that response 
is addressed in the following section. 
52Direct Test, of Committee witness Michael J. McFadden, R98-057-12, 00192, 
15-17 (April 1, 1999). [Addendum J]. 
53Prefiled Direct Test, of Large Industrial Group witness Kevin C. Higgins, R99-
057-20, 01216, 3 (April 19, 2000). 
54The evidence was sufficiently clear to prompt Commission Chairman Mecham's 
query during hearings: 
If Questar Gas were completely separate, and . . . a pipeline serving 
Questar Gas, unaffiliated with it, came to it and said, we're taking this 
new gas, and its going to lower the BTU content, don't you think - I 
mean is it unreasonable to think that completely unaffiliated 
distribution company would raise all sorts of Cain about that? 
Rep. Tr. of Proceedings, R98-057-12, 00088, 504-505 (June 23, 1999). 
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2. Transport of Coal Seam Gas was a business Opportunity for 
Questar Pipeline — not a Regulatory Imposition. 
Questar Gas's parent company representatives sought to buttress its diverting 
argument that the C02 Plant remedy was a response to customer safety concerns and not 
the product of conflicting affiliate interests by asserting that federal government 
regulations imposed an unavoidable obligation upon Questar Pipeline to transport the coal-
seam gas: 
This coal seam gas, nevertheless, met FERC-approved specifications of the 
interestate pipeline that serves those producing fields, Questar Pipeline 
Company (QPC), and QPC has accordingly been obligated under FERC 
'open access' regulations to take delivery of any such gas meeting its tariff 
requirements.55 
This Company assertion is incomplete, at best, as it implies the odd notion that 
FERC would require a pipeline company to transport gas even if the company lacked the 
system capacity to do so. The record clearly shows that any Questar Pipeline obligation to 
transport the coal-seam gas only arose after Questar Corporation's voluntary decision to 
pursue, and capture, that business opportunity, and only after it expanded QPC's system to 
accommodate the producers' growing transport requirements. The transport contracts 
voluntarily negotiated between Questar Pipeline and the coal-seam gas producers were 
produced during discovery and are referenced in the record. They were negotiated and 
executed years before any coal-seam gas problem arose, and years before any Questar 
concerns about customer safety were professed in these proceedings; and explicitly state 
55Rebuttal Test, of Company witness Alan K. Allred, R99-057-20, 00769,2 (May 
24, 2000). 
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they were for "future capacity;" that is "capacity not currently available on Questar 
Pipeline's system."56 Once Questar Pipeline had secured those "future capacity" transport 
contracts, Questar Corporation took the further voluntary step and made the necessary 
investment to expand Questar Pipeline's system to accommodate the increasing volumes 
of coal-seam gas which were projected from the Price area. The importance of this 
business opportunity for Questar Pipeline, and Questar Corporation's investments in 
further QPC system enhancements, were the subjects of regular Questar Corporation 
disclosures at the time.57 
Despite this evidence from its own records, Questar Gas's parent company 
representatives continued to assert that governmental regulations - and not pursuit of a 
56Copies of these contracts were produced in response to Committee and Division 
Data Requests. Both Committee witness McFadden and Division witness Hanson 
referenced these contract provisions in their testimony that Questar Pipeline's business of 
transporting the coal seam gas arose out of its voluntary pursuit of a business opportunity, 
and not any regulatory requirement. See Direct Test, of Michael J. McFadden, R98-057-
12, 00192, 13 (April 1, 1999). [Addendum J]; and Direct Test, of Darrell S. Hanson, R98-
057-12, 000180, 16 (April 1, 1999). [Addendum H]. 
57For example, Questar's 1996 Report to Shareholders states on page 23: 
An expansion project is under way near Price, Utah, the site of a large 
coal-seam gas-drilling program. An estimated 600 wells are planned 
to tap enormous methane reserves. Current daily production of 50,000 
dth per day could increase to 250,000 dth by the year 2002. Questar 
Pipeline's initial investment will be $1 million, with additional 
potential expenditures for new facilities as production increases. 
See footnote no. 21, above, for further examples of Questar Corporation's public 
statements throughout this time period regarding voluntary investment in, and expansion 
of, Questar Pipeline's system. 
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business opportunity - caused Questar Pipeline to transport the coal-seam gas. Their 
persistence further indicates the importance of understanding what "the problem that lies 
at the heart of the issue" in these proceedings really is: 
Q Mr. Hanson and Mr. McFadden state that Questar Pipeline could have 
refused to transport the coal seam gas if it did not have available 
capacity... Is this correct? 
A No. Questar Pipeline did have transportation capacity, . . . The 
compression facilities and pipeline looping that Mr. Hanson refers to 
were pipeline enhancements to Questar Pipeline made in other locations 
and unrelated to the coal seam production. Once these facilities were 
installed, additional capacity was available on Questar Pipeline's system. 
While some of this capacity was contracted for prior to the completion 
of the pipeline compressing and looping facilities, the capacity was 
properly posted in accordance with FERC policies and regulations. . . 
There is no such [FERC] obligation or ability for any interstate pipeline 
to work against its economic interests.. .58 
According to this further Company testimony, Questar Pipeline did and did not have 
capacity to transport the increasing quantities of coal-seam gas produced. Division 
witness Hanson responded to this did and did not testimony with the evidence in the 
record: 
Q On page 12, lines 13-15 of his rebuttal testimony Mr. Allred indicated 
that the facilities you mentioned in your prefiled testimony were not 
necessary for the transportation contracts with the coal seam producers. 
Is his statement correct? 
A Not according to information supplied by the Company. Copies of the 
contracts were provided as confidential information so I will not say 
much about the details. Almost all of the firm contracts have a provision 
indicating that the agreement was for capacity that was not available and 
that Questar would proceed with due diligence to get the necessary 
58Rebuttal Test, of Company witness Alan K. Allred, R98-057-12, 00093, 12 
(April 26, 1999). 
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facilities in place. I asked what facilities were necessary, Cross 
Examination Exhibit No. 6 is a copy of the response to that request 
Unless we have been provided wrong information the new facilities I 
described were required.59 
The most fitting closure to the Company's unsubstantiated assertion that Questar 
Pipeline's transport of the coal seam gas arose out of some government regulation are the 
words of its principal witness buried in the did-and-did-not statement quoted above: "there 
is no such obligation or ability for any interstate pipeline to work against its economic 
interests..." [Emphasis added, ed.]. That is the essence of the matter at issue here. 
Questar Pipeline was much more than a responding non-profit conduit of FERC "open 
access" gas; and the increasing quantities of coal-seam gas appearing in Questar Gas's 
distribution system were not the hapless result of some external pipeline "obligation." 
Those increasing coal seam gas quantities were the direct result of Questar Corporation's 
voluntary and intentional pursuit of Questar Pipeline's "economic interests" - economic 
59Rebuttal Test, of Division witness Darrell S. Hanson, R98-057-12, 00182, 8-9 
(June 23, 1999). Cross Examination Exhibit No. 6 is Division Data Request No. 8.1. Its 
question to the Company and the Company's response was: 
Q Most of the contracts [between QPC and the coal seam gas 
producers, ed.] required new facilities to be able to provide the 
necessary transportation service. What new facilities were 
required? 
A The two facilities referred to in the contracts were the ML loop 
and the Oak Springs Compressor. 
Division Data Request No. 8.1, R98-057-12, 00153. See also, the ambiguous cross-
examination response of Company witness Allred in the June 22, 1999 Reporter's 
Transcript of Proceedings. R98-057-12, 00087, 53-58. 
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interests which Questar Corporation is certainly entitled to pursue, but not with utility 
ratepayer subsidization. 
The voluntary and intentional Questar business decisions in question - made years 
before these proceedings arose and reconfirmed through later Questar Corporation 
expansions to Questar Pipeline's system - were made by Questar Corporation officials 
who knew at the time that realization and development of the coal-seam gas transport 
business opportunity would eventually lead to the very "customer safety" problem they 
here seek to saddle ratepayers with. That is the "heart of the issue" in these proceedings. 
C. Questar Affiliates Determined Questar Gas's Response to its Gas Quality 
Problem. 
This Petition has thus far reviewed evidence in the record of (1) Questar's 
management control of Questar Gas's affairs, and (2) the serious conflict of interest 
between the utility and its Questar affiliates over Questar Pipeline's transport of the central 
Utah coal-seam gas - with the evidence on both issues conclusively supplemented by the 
admission of the Company (regarding affiliate control) and its own documentation 
(regarding affiliate conflict of interest and Questar Corporation's voluntary pursuit of the 
coal-seam gas business opportunity). The remaining critical affiliate interest evidence to 
be considered will show how Questar Corporation utilized its control of Questar Gas to 
make the utility serve conflicting affiliate interests instead of its own in addressing and 
resolving what was really Questar Corporation's coal-seam gas problem. 
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Besides the affiliate control starkly evident in Questar Gas's silent acquiescence to 
the growing presence of incompatible coal seam gas in its distribution system,60 the most 
transparent evidence of Questar Corporation's use of the utility to serve affiliate interests 
is the actual non-arms-length C02 Plant remedy itself Record evidence already discussed 
above shows that remedy was imposed on Questar Gas to protect Questar Pipeline's 
growing coal seam gas transport business. It constitutes a direct subsidy of Questar 
Pipeline's business and, moreover, was implemented in a way which needlessly 
maximized the benefits to Questar affiliate interests by even placing ownership of the 
newly created asset ratepayers were paying for with a non-regulated affiliate.61 The 
questionable affiliate transaction which structured that remedy caused Commissioner 
Jones to describe it as "one of the biggest problems of this whole thing;"62 and prompted 
the further Commission comment in its Order that the transaction was "[t]he most 
troubling question" in its deliberations63 - however, apparently not sufficiently troubling to 
generate any further Commission examination of its very obvious violation of Commission 
As already noted, the link between Questar Gas's six plus years of unnatural 
silence and its affiliated relationship with Questar Pipeline was obvious to Commission 
Chairman Mecham during the hearings. See footnote 54, above. 
61
 Article 1 of the November 25, 1998 "Carbon Dioxide Extraction Agreement." 
Exhibit 5 to Company's Application. R98-057-12, 00001. [Addendum G]. Direct Test, 
of Division witness Darrell S. Hanson, R98-057-12, 00180,4-7 (April 1, 1999). 
[Addendum H]. 
62Rep. Tr., R98-057-12, 00088, 500, lines 10-13 (June 23, 1999). 
63Questar Gas, R99-057-20, 00704, 35 (August 11, 2000) (Report and Order). 
[Addendum A], 
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policy (see the discussion starting on page 37, below). Division witness Hanson explored 
the decision-making mechanics that underscore not only how affiliate interests caused the 
utility to issue the C02 Plant contract to a non-regulated affiliate, but how affiliate interests 
more generally determined the utility's participation in solving Questar's gas quality 
problem: 
Q Did you find any evidence that affiliate relationships affected QGC's 
selection of the gas processing agreement with an affiliate that is the 
subject of this docket as its solution to the low BTU problem? 
A. Yes. We asked extensive data requests on the process leading to the 
solution the company chose. The decision was made on what the 
impact would be on the total Questar Corporation... 
We asked if a review of FERC cases had been done.. .The answer was 
that the Company could not identify where any review had been made. 
We asked about any negotiations with producers or shippers over 
appropriate C02 and BTU levels for coal bed methane gas being 
delivered to QPC. The answer was that no negotiations. . .have been 
conducted. 
We also asked about the creation of the Tariff Task Force, which I have 
already explained was not followed up on.64 [Emphasis added, ed.]. 
In subsequent testimony, Mr. Hanson continues: 
In responses to our data requests, we got memos, copies of slide presentations, 
and studies. We did not get what I would consider a reasonable analysis of 
the relevant facts that a prudent decision maker would use in making the 
decision. There should be something similar to a bid analysis that is usually 
part of a capital budget process.. .The absence of a document or documents 
used by the decision maker that compares the alternatives from the 
perspective of QGC and its customers illustrates a lack of prudence.. . 
64Direct Test, of Division witness Darrell S. Hanson, R98-057-12,00180, 9-13 
(April 1, 1999). [Addendum H]. 
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. . .[I]t looks like the Company identified some good alternatives but 
dropped the analysis when they identified an alternative that provides an 
investment opportunity with a guaranteed return for Questar Corporation. 
There would be no risk, no revenue lag, guaranteed reo»M-t\. and an 
unregulated asset paid for by the customer when it is all over | Kmpha 
added, ed.]. 
Division expert witness hi i tuilrs !• Olson • • |nl" in i 1 nil IK HI "I1, -M1 U1 11"!1, -nid 
FER C matters, responded to testimony of Questar Gas witness Alan K. Allred, that 
attempted to rebi it such testimony In initial comments Dr. OK m stales;:: 
With respect to this hearing record, my view is that QGC has been imprudent 
in its gas supply activities and is now asking to be bailed out by the 
Commission. Further, it is clear to me that the affiliate relationship 
between Questar Gas and Questar Pipeline is not beneficial to IItah 
ratepayers,66 [Emphasis added, ed.]. 
I >i\ ()lson describes how Questar Gas, were it serving its own rather than conflicting 
M h * ' - ; t .scovery and development of 
coal-seam <jas iiclds near Price, Ulai I V AK< „! 
i'-ik- *x-itc! i. dcs from its pipeline supplier, >r to c\cn direcil} access that gas source 
or another pipeline source with its own constructed pipeline, TTc explains that Questar Gas 
did >mmon management. 
[Emphasis added, ed j 
65Rebuttal Test, of Darrell S. I Tanson, R98-057-12, 00182, 3-5 (June 23, 1999). 
[ '!"" :::l iendi lml I] 
66DirectI est. of Divisu ., 
(June 17, 1999). [Addendum ' i. 
K „ Hi lihiiK I i W .mi ll'W u - :,00h<) 7 
bJId. at 8-iu i * Mson Mgued that while QGC would had to have processed the 
gas to lower CO k\eK it would onh he processing the gas it actually used - not nil the 
p;v; ihc ax)\ se.ni JUS producers produced and Questar Pipeline transpo 
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Further convincing evidence that the decision to install and operate the C02 Plant at 
utility ratepayers'cost was driven by affiliate interests and not utility interests lies in the 
the fact that the cost allocation violates fundamental rate-making principles of "cost 
causation/' which - for sound economic reasons as well as regulatory reasons - would 
assign the costs to correct a problem to the parties causing it and not to the parties affected 
(the utility and its ratepayers). Committee expert witness Michael J. McFadden, as well as 
several other witnesses in these proceedings, testified to that point.68 
D. The CQ2 Plant Contract Violates the Commission's own Policy as well 
as this Court's Interpretation of that Policy. 
One revealing measure of the Commission's abuse of discretion in treating the 
prudency issues of affiliate control and conflict of interest in these proceedings is the 
extent to which its response violates prior enunciated Commission standards for examining 
and reviewing such matters. In its approval of the 1984 restructuring of Mountain Fuel 
Supply Company, which conditionally permitted Questar Corporation ownership of the 
public utility interests that are Questar Gas today, the Commission very carefully and 
deliberately noted: 
68Direct Test, of Committee witness Michael J. McFadden, R98-057-12, 00192, 
17-20 (April 1, 1999). [Addendum J]. Substantial expert testimony was provided in these 
proceedings on why accounting cost causation principles and sound economic theory 
would place the cost consequences of processing the coal seam gas on the producers (as a 
cost of production) and/or transporter (as a cost of delivery) of the gas rather than on 
those unwillingly affected, which space constraints do not allow to be further explored 
here. See, for example, Prefiled Direct Test, of Large Industrial Group witness Kevin C. 
Higgins, R99-057-20, 01216, 9-11 (April 19, 2000); and Prefiled Direct Test, of Division 
witness George R. Cornpton, PhD., R99-057-20, 00965, 8-15 (April 19, 2000). 
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Substantial involvement in non-utility activities changes the risk characteristics 
of the corpoiHt entitx [Potential conflicts of interest between affiliated 
entities •;» "^ -.* tf^  operations of the t-nlih become more diverse, 
particularly as the entity shifts its emphasis aw a> from utility operations, 
requiring careful regulatory oversight uml Hie utility operations. • 
Transactions and allocations between affiliates create numerous 
opportunities for unfair treatment and must be adequately reviewed by 
regulators.69 [Emphasis added, ed.]. 
This Court further interpreted the nature of the affiliate relationship inherently reqi iired by 
that 1984 Commission order in the later case of Mountain Fuel Supply v. Public Service 
Comn lission: 
It hs Li'Ue, »i " • .*.i u . o U l . - , . , :», i . > i l i i i . .o :>iw. . •. ^ <C; S 
relationship \xii* v^uestar in a l\>84 order format n/nig tne 
reorganization that resulted in the current corporate structure However, one 
condition ! the order -* • :"• *< Mi K* < *
 ;-;* * »u arms-length5 
relationship with Questar and its affiliates. ° |i mpha is added, ed j 
in niii.i .mi 1 ' I n (IIIHIIIII" <I I iMt-Iil x\ IIII h I* commission COIIMUUCU 
necessary under the circumstances, this c ,-.>mmission r * \ ' d.-.u -*-' ; * 
:: : i i :li isive, stubborn, and, pervasive evidence of affiliate contrc. j.nd couilia of interest 
before it - even the parent company representative's direct admission of complete parent 
comp.my niariapciiHiil touliol ul lii.; nlili(\ % «iI l«tn* In *o doing the Commission 
arbitral iiy and unjustifiabl) r ignored its own earlier enunciated " ;-.i;r^ • * \ v • - . ' 
regulating the affiliate relationships so evident in these pioceeiL-i^. ito abuse oi 
«InM.H:IIion is most ob\ ions in its failure to censure the C0 2 Plant contract itself, which is a 
OLKXU ! \ddendum b j . 
'"* * Mountain Fuel Supply v. Public Service Commission, 861 P.2d 414, 428 (I Jtah 
1WJ), 
39 
patently obvious violation of the Commission's own standard for the relationship that is to 
pertain between the utility and its Questar affiliates. It should go without saying that an 
"arms-length relationship " requires something more distant than the same person or 
management structure acting as both offeror and offeree or contractor and contractee.71 
Questar openly disregarded this Commission standard in the management structure it 
implemented for its Questar Regulated Services subsidiaries and in the affiliate decisions 
and transactions evident in these proceedings, and the Commission did not even respond. 
The Commission's dismissive and arbitrary treatment of this critical affiliate 
transaction evidence is further evident in its statement already cited in this Petition: 
The record is insufficient to permit us to determine whether the Company's 
analysis of options prior to early 1998 was sufficiently objective and thorough 
. . . to reach a conclusion whether options were ruled in or out as a result of the 
influence of affiliate interests.72 
What "Company analysis" can the Commission possibly be referring to? The Gas Quality 
Team's analysis, which was directed by Questar Regulated Services, staffed for the most 
part by Questar Pipeline and Questar Regulated Services personnel, and focused on 
7lMr. D. N. Rose is simultaneously president and CEO of Questar Regulated 
Services and its subsidiaries, Questar Gas and Questar Pipeline. The C02 Plant contract 
was between Questar Gas and a newly-created subsidiary of Questar Pipeline, Questar 
Transportation Services Company ("QTC"). Mr. Alan K. Allred, the Company's primary 
witness in these proceedings, was simultaneously Manager of Regulatory Affairs for 
Questar Gas and Questar Pipeline and a member of the staff of the president of Questar 
Regulated Services. He testified that Mr. Rose made the decision, on behalf of both 
Questar Gas and Questar Pipeline, for the utility to enter into the C02 Plant contract with 
QTC. See the discussion of Affiliate control, above in this Petition. 
72This statement is one of the critical findings of the Commission. See the 
discussion above at page 16. 
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Qucsiai Pipeline interests? Or Questar Regulated Services1 pipeline analyses addressing 
s interest in expanding Questar Pipeline's capacity to transport more coal seam 
gas: i IIOSL -lu hie only pi irported Company analyses of options prior to early 1998 
irien in ni in llin i HI 'ui iiii mil Mm (rrlainh wen in I "I mitpjii, analyses III uis clear 
from the record that the utility was unable to produce an) ? "Coi npany analyses" or other 
utility response to the deleterious effect which QPC's transport oi Price-area coal-seam 
gas had on its distribution system.. - I hat very relevant fact is itself further persuasive 
evidence 111 ml iiiillilllliilhi " nplmii ' i I ICM m i n i in IIII Il mil pi i mi In III111 "IK ,is ,i Mm < I icsi i l l nil Hit 
influence of affiliate interests." The Commissioners' further statement "M n lor can a 
si ifficient record be developed" is overly restrained, to say the least, in light of the ample 
• -t . . . *..; ..; *.. ;. ' and tui M, .*derscores its w illfi il 
uiaicgoiii oi the eviden 
The « o.'s iission *^ Uidei in tiicse proceedings very clearly demonstrates its 
arbitrary disregard of Commission-enunciated standards regarding affiliate transactions 
involving Uuesiai (i;is l;nr Mm time period pn t dismissed as 
Utah Code Ann. J$ 54 1 1 J- provides. in | \ 
Ihc Commission may, with respect to a^s .',.u . i within its 
fiction, order the director ol the Division ol Public Utilities 
{1 ) conduct research, studies, and m\ estigations . . . 
* v*dc Ann. § 54-4-2 provides, in part; 
Whenever the Commission believes in... ,i >*our«j niiio ^ IM. 
be in the interest of the public, | thai I an in\ estimation should be 
luade of any act or omission to act ol an\ public utih1^, it 
shall investigate the same upon ii, own .u^a^. ... 
Utah Code Ann ': " -1-1-4(2) provides, in part: 
The t'ommission shall have power to investigate contracts 
^ tiees . , of any public utility 
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insufficient the context of evidence which conclusively demonstrated affiliate control and 
conflict of interest, and for the period after "early 1998" it dismissed the patently obvious 
affiliate influence and control manifest in the C02 Plant contract and remedy itself. 
If, as the Company's admission and other evidence in the record of these 
proceedings shows, Questar's affairs are effectively under Questar non-regulated affiliate 
control; and, further, if Questar can compromise ratepayer interests to favor and further 
those conflicting affiliate interests at ratepayers' expense, and then dress up its self-serving 
actions in such a way that when they come before the Commission they are uncritically 
accepted as authentic and reasonable Questar Gas decisions and actions, there is really no 
enduring substance to the Commission's well-founded concerns and standards in its 1984 
order regarding affiliate transactions. 
II. THE COMMISSION ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE 
COMPANY'S APPLICATION FOR FAILURE TO PROVE 
AFFILIATE INTERESTS DID NOT INFLUENCE THE 
SELECTION OF THE C0 2 PLANT REMEDY. 
There is an alternative source of error in the Commission's Order which warrants 
this Court's reversal. It flows not from the evidence the Commission refused to consider 
and make the basis of a just and reasonable decision, but rather from the findings which 
the Commission implicitly and explicitly did make. 
Assuming, in the alternative, that it was within the Commission's fact-finding 
discretion to ignore the conclusive evidence of lack of prudence in the record regarding 
affiliate control, conflict of interest, and non-arms-length transactions, and to conclude 
such evidence was "insufficient," the Commission erred in not making the critical finding 
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that consequently flows from that conclusion; namely, tt lat the Coi iipai: ly failed ii i its 
burden r-Tproo; Once again, its conclusion was: 
. u. i>> n^ullicicnt to permit us to determine whether the Company's 
ttiwivM> ui options prior io early 1998 was sutficK nth objective and thorom |lt 
that is, to reach a conclusion whethe? - ^ ; - ? r ^ ^ -•• -1 •- -^ -v. •* f 
the influence of affiliate interest 1'i 
That conclusion necessarily carries in its wake the corollary finding that the Conij -p* 
vi co pio\iUc Miiiuiont evidence to show affiliate interests did not influence the 
t" .a , , i L.iaiiiisn that critical I act 
it failed in its burden of establishing n critical elen , M
 ; >; 
Plant costs are prudent, just and reasonable and hence recoverable in customer rates. 
li.v. ;>t;iiKiiUi$... pioot \\lnui UIL Company bears in a rate proceedings is clearly 
state* v • -" • . e Comn it s sion:75 
In the regulation of pub! v utilities by governmental authority, a fundamental 
principle is: the burden rests heavily upon a nuhf - pa. , ~ it is entitled to rate 
* ^af:,1 not i ipon the commission, the eomm- :=»n staff, or any interested 
- or protestant; to prove the contrary (Citation omitt d) \ ^"ftit> has the 
burden of proof to demonstrate its proposed increase in rates and charges is just 
and reasonable. . . Rate making t< not an adversary proceeding in which the 
applicant needs only to present \ puma iacie case to be entitled to relief. 
(Citation omitted). A state rcguhaoiy commission, whose powers have been 
invoked to fix a reasonable rate, is entitled to know and before it can act 
adxisedh must he informed ol all relevant facts Otherwise the hands of the 
iaton body could be tied in such fashion it could not effectively determine 
whether a proposed rate was justified. (Citation omitted^ 
74Questa* ' ' •!. K<><) OS"*1 H Ill) "'III I \ I  ( AIIJMI J I I '1101)1 f Ni-poil tin I < lulni I 
- t in i •-
Utah Department of Business Regulation v. Public Service Commission, 614 P.2d 
+„ MvP- i f 'Pfe ih 1980) 
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If the Commission were correct in its conclusion that the Company failed to provide 
sufficient evidence regarding a critical issue in the proceedings; namely, whether affiliate 
interests influenced the Company's options, then, under this Court's standard, the 
Company clearly failed in its ultimate burden to show it is entitled to relief, and the 
Commission consequently erred in not making that finding and dismissing the Company's 
Application for C02 Plant cost recovery on those grounds. 
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
This Petition addresses the Commission's disregard of evidence in the record of 
these proceedings which clearly and conclusively shows that Questar Gas's decision to 
enter into a non-competitively bid, non-arms-length contract with an unregulated affiliate 
was an imprudent decision. That non-arms-length affiliate transaction was only the 
culminating step in a series of Questar Corporation actions which favored Questar 
Pipeline's business interests in capturing and developing the business opportunity of 
gathering and transporting Price-area coal-seam gas over the already vested and clearly-
defined interests of Questar's public utility subsidiary and its ratepayers. The record 
shows Questar Corporation secured that coal-seam gas transport opportunity knowing the 
gas was incompatible with the requirements of its utility subsidiary, and chose to transport 
the growing quantities of that gas in a way which necessarily caused it to enter the utility's 
distribution system to the harm of utility ratepayers. Finally, when Questar Pipeline could 
no longer ameliorate the deleterious effect of the coal-seam gas on utility customers' 
appliances by such palliative measures as blending with other gas sources, Questar 
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Regulated Services' president and CEO selecte 4 and ai ithoi ized tl ic C0 2 PLml in iiinh 
which in violation of fundamental cost causation principles for allocating costs -
assigned the costs to correct the problem,, to Questar Gas instead of to the pi pel I -: 
i ompiiir iiul < ati MMIII JMS pmdiu IT . nlio < anst il III I" loicovri, ill.mi in: i net I)1 noi mil ,' 
inequitably and wrongly assigned the Plant's costs to Questar G. *T mounded the 
inequity by also assigning the separate benefit of ownership of the hard asset the utility 
was paying for to an unregulated .uiiuiuun vol* questar Pipeline 
The :!i\' i i l< n i l . i n \ I IIU i II Il il II n i a l l i l i a l r n •• s t a i G i t s I S K ICMII H I lllllli 
record of these proceedings. It includes (1) the conclusive evidence of affiliate control of 
^—---- Cms and absence of any reasonable and prudent management person in the utility 
represei .. . ..acrcsls in a cw**; i ol interest with its 
,-oral ion had in fin thering Questar Pipeline's transport of the coal-scam gas, ar«l (3) 
Questar's exercise of its control of the ulililv to furl her affiliate interests at the expense of 
, . . , oiinnnes... ... . ..IH/Abi;^ <5 remedy 
was not a prudent utility deci ; i «n«11 and (lin ivMillmn eosl . wvw (Iincluir mil pnidenlh 
• * .--J L->sts which should be recoverable from utility ratepayers. 
i 1IK> lacluat •**<.. ntiarv trail was plainly before the Commission, which in an 
earlier case appmvnl Queslai s \Mieiship nil (In* udlily on the i ondilion tnat Quesiar 
maintain an arms-leih'lh ivlahonship i r h n en Hi « "nuni in , jinul ml", aflilules .in I luilhcr 
expressed serious concerns about the "potential conflicts of interests between affiliated 
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entities" that "create numerous opportunities for unfair treatment" and require "careful 
regulatory oversight of the utility operations."76 
The Commission in these proceedings arbitrarily disregarded not only the 
conclusive evidence of unfair non-arms-length control and treatment of Questar Gas, it 
ignored as well its own standards for carefully overseeing such matters to prevent the very 
abuse that occurred in this instance. The linchpin admission in these proceedings by a 
Questar Regulated Services' witness for the Company - the Company's primary witness -
that Questar Regulated Services executives overtly and totally controlled the affairs of 
both Questar Gas and Questar Pipeline - should have been a clear and present signal to the 
Commission that things were amiss with the utility it has the responsibility to protect and 
regulate. The further testimony of Committee and Division witnesses, and the 
documentation produced by the Company during discovery and referenced in the record 
conclusively show that Questar voluntarily and intentionally pursued and captured the 
business of transporting central Utah coal seam gas, and expanded Questar Pipeline's 
capacity to accommodate the growing production of that gas - knowing full well the gas 
was incompatible with the long-established requirements of its utility subsidiary. Those 
decisions, made years earlier, were the source of the problem which Questar now wants 
76Mountain Fuel, 84-057-10, 13 (Final Order) [Addendum E]; and Mountain Fuel 
Supply v. Public Service Commission, 861 P.2d 414, 428 (Utah 1993). The 
Commission's 1984 Order also cites this Court's statement from the Wexpro //case, Utah 
Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601, 618 
(Utah 1983), that a utility's legal responsibilities are: "To make just and reasonable 
charges for its services and to assure that those services are "in all respects adequate, 
efficient, just and reasonable.'" 
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the utility and ratepayers to bear the costs to correct i indei a late ii i- tl le day professed 
concern for customer safety. . . 
If customer safety was a serious concern, it was a concern Questar created and one 
which Quest;!!' alhl iairs should IIJI v iiiin/lv jiJdivssoil I IIJJ; In in ic illi; hclaicd expressions 
j n these proceedings. The C 0 2 Plant would have worked just as effectively had Qi lestar 
Pi| Mine paid for its construction and operation and w ill continue to work just as 
effectively whether or not Questar Gas customers continue to pay for it. Placing the cost 
I ii in n In in (nil the 1* 1,11 ill1 ill ( hirslfii .illihdlrs instem! ol r,ipl i\ < • i<iU payers also mnir equilaMv 
fits with the Plant 's ownership and resulting revenue stream, which Questar 's non-arms-
length contract inequitably preserved for Questar Pipeline and its newly created subsidiary. 
nnmission's abu:x *;. UL.^WU^L II, not atv *^unh il.,s case op tU basis of the 
evidence and critical issue * • 
concluding the Company had provided insufficient evidence to show affiliate influence did 
not determine the Company 's options, and then not making the consequent determinative 
(iiidiii - Ih.il tlit i'omjMiis liuli'illii >u ilain its burden ol proof I hat is certainly an 
alternative lean1 ground iui icversing tl: le Commissioi l's Order \ 1.1:1: i respect tc all :::) < :' - ing • 
CO^ Plant costs into uisionu/f rates. However, the more weighty error of the Commission, 
s,% «. e^es to the heart of its regulatory responsibilities reviewed so painstakingly in its 
h , x ; l , w as its abi iseof discretion in ai bitraril) T clisi: egai dii l g the uiifaii and 
ii^tLiin^iital treatment accorded Questar < > 5 > • < i \\ .*<u! 
* sidize the interests of Questar Pipeline. The Commission has broad discretion as a 
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regulatory agency, but it does not have the discretion to unreasonably ignore conclusive 
and overwhelming evidence, or to impose standards and conditions regarding utility 
ownership and control and then simply and arbitrarily disregard their violation, or to 
unreasonably implement unjust and unreasonable rates. 
That is what happened in these proceedings. The Commission heard and ignored 
such evidence. It further ignored its own standards for examining such evidence, and it 
finally ignored the serious violation of Commission policy and statutory rate-making 
procedures which the evidence clearly discloses and which resulted in the implementation 
of unjust and unreasonable utility rates. In light of the Commission's treatment of these 
issues, the Committee respectfully requests this Court to reverse the Commission's 
decision based on the clear evidence in the record. 
Respectfully submitted this 1st day of October, 2002. 
REED T. WARNICK 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for The Committee of Consumer 
Services 
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185 SOUTH STATE STREET STE 1300 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
PATRICIA E SCHMID 
NORTHWl S PIPELIN1 
GAS 
295CHlPEi. v%,\: 
SALT LAKE TIT 
KERN RIVER 
108 
J. CRAIG SMITH 
C/O NIELSEN & SENIOR 
INTERMOTINTMN MTTNTCI -. . , , 
AGENCY 
EAGLE GATE TOWER SI) 11 E 11 Ou 
60EAS1"-SOUTH TEMPLE 
SALT LAKE (TIT UT '-4 1 
li \kul .D AKANDOl 1S1 
INTERMOUNTAIN MUNICIPAL GAS 
AGENCY 
EAGLE GATE TOWER SUITE 1 ! 00 
60 EAST - SOI JTH TEMPT r 
SALT LAKE MTY n > ' I 
TONYJRUDMAN 
MAGNESIUM CORP OF \\^vv^ * 
230 NORTH 2200 W LSI 
SALT LAKE CUV V- '• : > 
WILLIAM EVANS 
PARSONS BEHLE LATIMER 
ONE UTAH CENTER SUITE 1800 
201 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
ROBERT REEDt.K 
PARSONS BEHLE LA . iMi-.K 
ONE UTAH CENTER SUil'I 'W0 
201 SOUTH MAIN STREET 
SALT LAKE C i n • "" .~ :: 
SANDER J. MOOY 
UTAH PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
160E300 S 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84114 
MICHAEL L. GINSBERG 
DIVISION OF PUBLIC UTILIES 
160 E 300 S 5TH FLOOR 
SALT LAKErr rv ; ' « : " 
C 
^f\AfO^< d1^? Uv-V 
/ IO 
